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The Relationship between Corporate Human Rights Responsibility 
Disclosure and Performance*
Changrok Soh**, Minwoo Kim, and Youngsoo Yu1
Corporate Human Rights Responsibility (CHRR) has gained considerable attention in recent 
discussions of business and regulation. Consistent with prior research on corporate legitimacy, a 
growing number of companies has begun disclosing CHRR information in annual reports. However, it 
has not been identified whether the voluntary disclosure of CHRR indeed leads to actual improvements 
in CHRR performance levels. This study examines the relationship between CHRR disclosure and 
performance using data on the largest 1,000 Korean companies from 2006 to 2014. Given the lack of 
prior empirical research on CHRR measurement, this study uses the number of complaints received 
by the National Labor Relations Commission in South Korea as the measure of the human rights 
performances of each company. The CHRR disclosure is scored using the self-reported labor and 
human rights data in annual reports with the format of Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines. The 
empirical results show that CHRR performance is not consistently associated with the disclosure of 
human rights reports. Nevertheless, this study finds that only reporting in compliance with international 
guidelines affects human rights performances. 
Keywords: Corporate Human Rights Responsibility, Business and Human Rights, Human Rights 
Disclosure, Human Rights Performance, Corporate Legitimacy
1. IntroductIon
the 2013 rana Plaza collapse, which killed 1,135 and injured approximately 2,500 
people in Bangladesh, demonstrated the tragic results of ignoring corporate human rights 
responsibility. Even though cracks had been found in the building the day before the collapse, 
the building’s owner and five garment factories housed in it had ordered their workers to 
return the following day and continue production for 31 Western multinational corporations 
(Mncs) (chowdhury, 2017: 1). this disaster was indeed a wake-up call for the global 
community to reconsider the impact of corporate behavior on human rights.     
As a response to the significantly increasing influence and weight of business in global 
affairs, corporate human rights responsibility has emerged as a key aspect of corporate 
responsibilities during last several decades (e.g. nolan, 2005; Weissbrodt, 2005; Leisinger, 
2006; Wouters and Shanet, 2008). Although profit and growth have been generally perceived 
as the priority of corporations, prior research demonstrates that they are not inherently 
in conflict with evolving roles and responsibilities of business. In light of this, various 
dimensions of corporate social responsibilities beyond profit maximization for shareholders 
have been suggested by scholars (e.g. carroll and Shabana, 2010). Freeman (1984, 1998) 
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argues that the rights of all stakeholders, who are directly or indirectly affected by a 
company’s activities, such as employees, consumers, sub-contractors, civil society and local 
community, should be equally taken into consideration in managerial decisions same as those 
of shareholders. 
despite these shifts in the scope and nature of corporate responsibilities, it is true 
that corporate human rights responsibility has not been spotlighted to a great extent, not 
only in most corporate Social responsibility (cSr) discussions, but also in most human 
rights discourses until relatively recently. As Wettstein (2012) points out, the conventional 
perception of corporate responsibilities may account for this lack of attention. First, corporate 
human rights responsibility has been regarded as part of corporate legal obligations rather 
than social responsibilities because cSr has been generally perceived as something 
fundamentally voluntary, philanthropic and subjective by nature (robinson, 2003: 9). Second, 
human rights policies have been understood politically and legally as a domain of states 
rather than companies while cSr has been perceived as orthodox private sector activities for 
corporate social legitimacy (Wettstein, 2012). 
Against such backdrop, we are led to ask questions such as what factors have brought 
about the changing conception of corporate human rights responsibility in the global 
economy? What circumstances have raised the public awareness of this issue and catalyzed 
the changes of corporate response? In the politico-economic context, economic globalization, 
which was accelerated by prevalent neo-liberalism and free trade sentiment in 1980s and 
1990s, induced the heavy competition and ‘race to the bottom’ of developing countries in 
the international labor market. While developing countries vigorously strived to attract 
foreign capital and investment after the collapse of communism, the poor labor conditions 
of those countries deteriorated even more. to make matters worse, the complicity between 
local governments and multinational corporations (Mncs) exacerbated the situations. 
these aggravating problems culminated in the anti-sweatshop movement triggered by the 
media exposure of the exploitative working environments and human rights violations of 
Mncs such as nike, disney and Levi Strauss in the apparel and footwear industries during 
1990s. this anti-sweatshop movement, which ignited a world-wide ‘naming and shaming’ 
campaign against those companies, is often cited as the turning point in the public perception 
of corporate human rights responsibility (e.g. Bartley, 2005; nolan, 2005; Bartley and 
child, 2007). on the one hand, using this momentum, the actors of international society like 
international organizations or civil society began to recognize the significance of complicated 
transnational business issues, which could not be controlled by the capability of any single 
state (Wolf, 2008; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). on the other hand, companies started to adopt 
voluntary codes of conduct in response to public pressures and disclosed their human rights 
performance for social legitimation (e.g. Bartley, 2005). 
the raised international awareness concerned with transnational corporate human 
rights accountability catalyzed the movement for human rights guidelines for business in 
the united nations (un). As a result, ‘the un Global compact (2000)’ stipulated human 
rights responsibilities as basic principles for business. however, its reliance on voluntary 
compliance brought about criticisms in terms of practicability. After a number of debates 
whether corporate human rights responsibility implementation mechanisms should be based 
on voluntary compliance or mandatory obligations, ‘the norms’ were proposed by the un 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights but they were finally 
rejected in 2004. right after that, the newly appointed Special representative of the Secretary 
General of the united States (SrSG), John ruggie, commenced to examine the international 
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guidelines to identify corporate human rights responsibility in 2005. the un framework for 
business and human rights; ‘Protect, respect and remedy’ was outlined by the SrSG’s third 
report in 2008, with the following introductory comment (ruggie, 2008; un, 2011);
“Business is the major source of investment and job creation, and markets can be highly 
efficient means for allocating scarce resources. they constitute powerful forces capable of 
generating economic growth, reducing poverty, and increasing demand for the rule of law, thereby 
contributing to the realization of a broad spectrum of human rights……
……the root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance 
gaps created by globalization—between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and 
the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences. these governance gaps provide the 
permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning 
or reparation. how to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our 
fundamental challenge.”
Subsequently, ‘the un Guiding Principles on Business and human rights,’ was 
announced in 2011 as the key international guidelines for business enterprises along with the 
recommendation for governments to promote a ‘national Action Plan (nAP) on business 
and human rights.’ Although its effectiveness in practice was questioned by critics due to 
its reliance on voluntary compliance, the international community responded in a relatively 
short period of time. As of January 2018, 19 states including uK, the netherlands, denmark, 
Spain, Finland, Lithuania, Sweden, norway, colombia, Switzerland, Italy, uSA, Germany, 
France, Poland, Belgium, chile, czech republic, Ireland have produced a nAP on business 
and human rights. In addition, 21 states are in the process of developing a national action 
plan, and either the NHRI or civil society in nine other states have taken the first steps in the 
development of a national action plan (un ohchr, 2018). this international trend may be 
perceived as a growing pressure for corporate managers to legitimize themselves from the 
perspective of human rights responsibility.   
In parallel with rapid economic globalization and raised public awareness of corporate 
responsibilities, a new political role of business beyond mere compliance with legal 
obligations or philanthropic social contribution has been observed (e.g. Matten and crane, 
2005; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). the vacuum of human rights responsibility due to the 
diminishing influence of the state as a primary protector and violator has been virtually filled 
in part by the expanding roles of business (Wettstein and Waddock, 2005). In this respect, the 
immediate public reactions to irresponsible corporate behaviors concerned with corporate 
human rights responsibility may be interpreted as highly enhanced expectations on business 
due to these changing politico-economic roles. Public pressures on business concerned with 
corporate human rights responsibility are increasing interconnected with real time world-
wide communication technology. Given this, the growing voluntary compliance with human 
rights initiatives and their disclosure may reflect the changing conception of human rights 
responsibility by corporate managers. 
First, an increasing number of companies are engaged in voluntary compliance with 
a variety of multi-stakeholder initiatives such as un Global compact, Global reporting 
Initiative (GrI), Fair Labor Association, Fair Wear Foundation, Global network Initiative, 
International code of conduct for Private Security Providers, Voluntary Principles on 
Security and human rights, Forest Stewardship council, Social Accountability International, 
International organization for Standardization (ISo), rugmark, etc (Baumann-Pauly, nolan, 
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Labowitz, and van heerden, 2016: 109).  
Second, the numbers of corporate human rights disclosures are increasing. For instance, 
the un Global compact database presents that 9,670 companies from 161 countries have 
engaged in the un Global compact, and 51,166 public reports have been submitted as 
of 28 January 2018. Furthermore, regarding that GrI report forms include human rights 
performance categories, it is also noteworthy that 9,240 reports were added to the GrI 
Sustainability disclosure database between 2015 and 2016 taking the total to 33,828 as of 30 
June 2016 (the GrI’s annual report 2015-2016). 
despite the diffusion of corporate human rights disclosure, most of these international 
initiatives are based on voluntary compliance rather than legal obligations or mandatory 
monitoring systems. So, can we say that these disclosures reflect a ‘real’ level of human rights 
commitment? Although growing numbers of companies have presented their human rights 
performance in their annual reports, it is not clear whether these reports reflect a genuine 
effort towards more humane businesses or are just window dressing in response to social 
pressures or peer competition. Little empirical research has been done on the relationship 
between corporate human rights disclosure and performance despite the evolving roles and 
responsibilities of business in the global economy. Most prior research on human rights has 
focused on when and why states ratify international treaties, thus accepting constraints on 
sovereignty. And, by extension, how engagement with international human rights treaties 
influenced democratization and human rights policies in these countries. Likewise, most prior 
studies on corporate responsibility have focused on the relationship between social disclosure 
and social performance rather than the human rights disclosure-performance relationship. 
More problematic, these earlier studies provide mixed evidence on the relationship. Given 
these limitations of the existing literature, this study specifically examines the relationship 
between corporate human rights responsibility disclosure and performance within the 
framework of legitimacy. 
2. LItErturE rEVIEW And hYPothESIS dEVELoPMEnt
the relationship between corporate human rights responsibility disclosure and 
performance has been marginalized in prior research despite the rapidly increasing 
influence of business in international society. Most human rights discourses have focused 
on the ratifications and commitments of states to international norms such as treaties. 
Little empirical examination has been conducted on corporate disclosure and performance 
with regards to international human rights responsibility guidelines. It is true that human 
rights behaviors of states and non-state actors like business enterprises may be inherently 
different. Nevertheless, prior research on the human rights treaty ratification and commitment 
mechanisms of states suggest important implications for this study. hafner-Burton, 
tsutsui, and Meyer (2008) worked to determine what factors drive states to ratify human 
rights treaties. Furthermore, they studied specifically why states with poor human rights 
performance, i.e., negative human rights records, have been engaged in international treaties 
in spite of subsequent constraints on their sovereignty (harfner-Burton, Mansfield, and 
Pevehouse, 2008; Harfner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse, 2015). Their study points out 
the legitimation of state performance as the key factor to account for the behaviors of these 
states. this is remarkable because they suggest a comprehensive framework to complement 
the shortcomings of other theoretical approaches: 1) the coercion or inducement by great 
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powers (realism); 2) preemptive actions for consolidating domestic democracy in response 
to domestic oppositions by binding to the international regime (Liberalism); 3) socialization 
procession, i.e., the perceived value of engagement to international norms diffused by 
altruistic governments and groups (Ideational theory) (Moravscik, 2000). 
the voluntary ratification of treaties by states may not be sufficiently identified with 
other theories that do not contain the conception of legitimation, especially when they 
politically retain high domestic autonomy in human rights policies and then when they have 
demonstrated poor human rights performance even after the ratification. two noteworthy 
implications are inferred from these studies. First, both state groups with good or poor 
performance records are similarly concerned with securing their legitimacy by presenting 
their human rights concerns internationally and domestically even though their ratifications 
of treaties are driven by different factors. Second, even states with poor human rights 
performance tend to willingly ratify treaties without the genuine intention of commitment, 
unless there are substantial counter forces to effectively put pressure on them to fulfill 
their treaty obligations (hafner-Burton and tsutsui, 2005; harfner-Burton, Mansfield, and 
Pevehouse, 2008; hafner-Burton, tsutsui, and Meyer, 2008). the analytical framework 
of states’ legitimation suggests meaningful directions how to conduct this research on the 
relationship between corporate human rights responsibility disclosure and performance. 
compared with the functions of states, which are meant to provide public goods, all 
activities in the private sector are for better financial performance. however, given that 
business enterprises are no less concerned than states with their legitimacy in terms of 
sustainability and vulnerability, prior research on states may provide a useful framework for 
an empirical examination of the relationship between corporate human rights responsibility 
disclosure and performance. Indeed, previous empirical studies of the motivations for 
voluntary compliance with international corporate human rights responsibility guidelines 
(Kim, Soh, and Yu, 2016) suggests that companies tend to comply with them for legitimizing 
their performance in response to external and internal pressures.  
consistent with the definition of organizational ‘legitimacy,’ i.e., ‘a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 
1995: 574), companies seek to establish the congruence between social values pertaining 
to their performance and norms of socially acceptable conducts through the process of 
legitimation (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Particularly, business enterprises are likely to be 
even more vulnerable than states regarding legitimacy due to their inherent dependency on 
public perceptions. therefore, they strive to consolidate their reputation and sustainability 
by minimizing risks and uncertainties through the legitimation of their performances in 
various dimensions (campbell, 2007). As a response to changing public perceptions, 
companies are inclined to voluntarily disclose corporate information in their annual reports 
as the representative type of strategic communication for bolstering corporate legitimacy 
(e.g. deegan, 2002; o’donovan, 2002; cho and Pattern, 2007; Bebbington, Larrinaga, 
and Moneva, 2008; Van der Laan, 2009). regarding considerable legitimation options for 
companies confronted with legitimacy threats, Lindblom (1994) identifies the following four 
strategies
a.  Educating and informing its ‘relevant publics’ about (actual) changes in the organization’s 
performance and activities; 
b. changing the perceptions of the ‘relevant publics’- but not its actual behavior;
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c.  Manipulating perception by deflecting attention from the issue of concern to other related issues 
through an appeal to, for example, emotive symbols;
d. changing external expectations of its performance.
regarding Lindblom’s suggestions, however, it is still not clear if the disclosing 
behaviors of companies for their legitimation were intended to reflect actual changes or 
only to favorably change public perceptions, even though there are numbers of prior studies 
which discussed social disclosure such as annual reporting from the perspective of corporate 
legitimacy (e.g. Patten, 1991, 2002; deegan and rankin, 1996; clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 
1999; campbell, 2000; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; deegan, rankin, and tobin, 2002; 
campbell, craven, and Shrives, 2003; Branco and rodrigues, 2008). thus, oliver (1991) 
contends that organizational behaviors may vary from passive conformity to active resistance 
depending on the perceived nature and context of pressures by corporate rational actors, i.e., 
management. under these circumstances, there have been studies that have tried to determine 
whether disclosed information, i.e., data in annual reports, is the reflection of real activities or 
only a type of cosmetic communication strategy towards shareholders and the public (Bowman 
and haire, 1975; Fry and hock, 1976; Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; 
Freeman and Jaggie, 1982; Wiseman, 1982). 
Although most of the prior research has been focused on corporate social or environmental 
disclosure-performance rather than specifically corporate human rights responsibility 
disclosure-performance, they demonstrate useful theoretical and methodological approaches 
for this study in the way that a) corporate social responsibility includes several areas such as 
standards, environmental stewardship and recognition of human rights (ryznar and Woody, 
2014: 1668); b) they are all related to the process of strategic legitimation in response to 
external pressures by corporate rational actors (see oliver, 1991); c) environmental violations 
are deemed to be part of human rights issue, as we saw in the European court of human 
rights (Echr)’s decision on 9 december 1994 underlined by Lee (2007: 354): 
In recent years, state actors have been found to have violated articles of human rights 
conventions for failing to stop the activities of non-state corporate actors. For example, in the 
case of López Ostra v. Spain, the European court of human rights (Echr) found that Spain had 
violated Article 8 of the European convention of human rights because the state failed to stop 
the activities of a waste-treatment plant whose operations caused nuisance and health problems for 
nearby inhabitants. In its decision, the court formally recognized that environmental degradation 
can obstruct one’s enjoyment of human rights.1
‘directive 2014/95/Eu of the European Parliament and of the council of 22 october 2014’ 
established the rules on disclosure of non-financial information by large public-interest 
entities with more than 500 employees for accountable, transparent and responsible business 
1 Article 8 of the European convention of human rights, which provides:
 “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
   2.  there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as 
is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.”
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behavior and sustainable growth. It also requires these companies in the Eu to disclose 
annual statements containing both environmental and social information in relation to 
environmental protection, social and employee-related matters, respect for human rights, 
anti-corruption and bribery matters by flexibly referring to international guidelines for 
business conduct such as the un Global compact, the un Guiding Principles on Business 
and human rights, the oEcd Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ISo 26000, the ILo 
tripartite declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
the Global reporting Initiative, etc. therefore, environmental performance disclosures are, 
in practice, increasingly synonymous with the issue of human rights performance as well. 
Literature from the two issue areas could be useful for cross-fertilization.
Moreover, it is also noteworthy that previous studies provide mixed evidence on the 
disclosure-performance relationship. 
First, they suggest that social disclosure may reflect real social performance, which is 
consistent with the theoretical framework of legitimacy. the test results of Bowman and 
haire (1975), which used annual report data from eighty-two food-processing corporations, 
show that social disclosure with annual reports may be considered as a reasonable surrogate 
for real activity. They argue that corporate social responsibility is not in fundamental conflict 
with the interests of the investor, i.e., maximizing profits. In many cases, adequate corporate 
responsiveness to social concerns using voluntary annual reports is perceived by investors not 
only to increase chance for successful business, i.e., sustainability, but also to reduce potential 
risk pertaining to corporate legitimacy. conducting a content analysis of the annual reports 
of the Fortune 500 published by Ernst & Ernst, Abbott and Monsen (1979) also demonstrate 
that the self-reported social disclosure can be a significant measure to analyze the dimensions 
of corporate response to external pressures. the study of Al-tuwaijri, christensen, and 
hughes li (2004) also demonstrates the positive relationship between prior environmental 
disclosures and current environmental performance. In their research, while environmental 
disclosures were measured based on a content analysis of four categories of environmental 
information reported in SEC10Ks, i.e., toxic waste, financial penalties, Potential Responsible 
Party designation for the cleanup, and oil and chemical spills, it is particularly noteworthy 
that environmental performance was quantitatively measured with the ratio of recycled waste 
to total waste instead of the qualitative rankings of the cEP, which is the most frequently 
used in prior studies. In the study by Luo and tang (2014) voluntary carbon disclosures had a 
significant positive association with actual carbon emissions. Therefore, the research results 
suggest that companies’ voluntary carbon disclosures with the carbon disclosure Project 
(cdP) reports indicate their actual carbon performance measured with two main indicators: 
carbon emission and mitigation. All these results support the argument that social and 
environmental disclosure may reflect actual performance. 
Second, in accordance with the legitimation strategies (Lindblom, 1994), the following 
research reveals that companies burdened with poor social or environment performance are 
likely to disclose more social or environmental information for their legitimation. Fry and 
hock (1976) argue that companies tend to emphasize social responsiveness more in their 
annual reports when they are under attack for being unresponsive based on their examination 
of 135 companies in fifteen industry groups from banking to mining. Furthermore, the 
environmental disclosures of 51 manufacturing companies including the president’s letter, 
management’s discussion and analysis (Md&A), and financial statement note sections of 
annual reports were analyzed in hughes, Anderson, and Golden (2001)’s research. they 
examined whether a company’s environmental disclosures reflect actual environmental 
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performance by comparing these data to three performance ratings of sample companies 
compiled by the council on Economic Priorities (cEP): good, mixed, and poor. they found 
that the disclosures are not useful in indicating a company’s actual performance levels 
because of the following reasons; first, test results did not show significant differences 
between the disclosures of good and mixed performers, second, poor performers appeared to 
disclose more information than the other two groups did.  
third, in contrast with the above research results, a significant relationship was not 
found in another group of studies. In their research on the relationship between companies’ 
environmental disclosure-performance as part of corporate responsibility estimation, Ingram 
and Frazier (1980) concluded that they could find merely a weak association. In other words, 
these results indicate that the content analysis scores of disclosures in annual reports do 
not strongly relate to the indices of companies’ environmental performance devised by the 
cEP. the lack of external monitoring of companies’ social disclosures, i.e., the absence of 
auditing by the third party, is suggested to account for this. Managers may use their own 
discretion and the biased selection of reporting information for legitimizing corporate 
performance. taking account of no conclusive empirical evidence between social disclosure 
and performance, Freeman and Jaggi (1982) paid particular attention to 10Ks in which the 
uS Securities and Exchange commission (SEc) has required companies to disclose pollution 
information since 1973. this was done because the authors noted that Ingram and Frazier 
(1980)’s study only used annual reports rather than total disclosure information. Annual 
reports, special social reports and 10Ks were meticulously examined and then these data were 
tested against the CEP pollution indices. The results also showed that there was no significant 
association between pollution disclosure-performance. In Wiseman (1982)’s research, a 
sample of 26 of the largest companies in the steel, oil, and pulp and paper industries were 
selected for the test, taking into consideration the greatest environmental problems and 
expenditures of these industries. he analyzed the relationship between environmental 
disclosure and performance by using the annual reports and cEP indices of these companies. 
the results show that corporate environmental disclosures are not related to the companies’ 
actual environmental performance. The findings of Rockness (1985) also support the results 
of previous research, demonstrating no association between the contents of annual reports’ 
environmental disclosures and performance. he suggests that standard setting levels and 
analytical interpretation may account for the different results between his research and 
previous ones (Bowman and haire, 1975; Fry and hock, 1976; Abbott and Monsen, 1979). 
Given this mixed evidence on the relationship between social disclosure and performance, 
as ullman (1985) points out, they may attribute to the limitation due to the weaknesses in 
sample and research methods. 
these prior studies on the relationship between social disclosure and performance 
suggest hypothetical implications for this study although they do not specifically focus on 
the relationship between corporate human rights responsibility disclosure and performance. 
An increasing number of companies have voluntarily disclosed their corporate human rights 
responsibility information through quality annual reporting. As shown by prior studies, 
companies tend to be sensitive to public pressures because social legitimacy is deemed to 
be an invaluable asset and its lack a great vulnerability, which requires them to respond to 
shifts in public perceptions. therefore, companies are inclined to disclose their corporate 
human rights responsibility performance to bolster their sustainability through proactive 
legitimation. 
nevertheless, the raised awareness of corporate human rights responsibility may drive 
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corporate rational actors, i.e., managers, in two opposite directions. on the one hand, the 
managers may regard corporate human rights responsibility compliance as an opportunity 
to enhance their competitiveness and sustainability while they simultaneously commit 
themselves to social expectations. Managers may be more sensitive to their legitimacy due 
to their increased visibility and vulnerability after corporate human rights responsibility 
disclosures. thus, the disclosing companies are more likely to try to improve their 
performance regardless of their original intentions at the beginning stage. on the other hand, 
other managers may merely perceive corporate human rights responsibility as an additional 
burden to be dealt with as inexpensively as possible without endangering their socially 
responsible image. In this respect, corporate human rights responsibility disclosures depend 
on the strategic decisions of rational actors in companies who want to enhance corporate 
legitimacy, as Lindblom (1994) suggests. thus, chr disclosures may imply two hypothetical 
assumptions; their actual performance is described on their annual reports as it is, otherwise, 
the data on their reports are discretionarily filtered for legitimizing their performance. 
hence, we predict that corporate human rights responsibility reporting may or may 
not properly reflect corporate human rights responsibility performances in the reporting 
companies given the mixed results of prior research on social disclosure and performance 
relationship (Bowman and haire, 1975; Fry and hock, 1976; Abbott and Monsen, 1979; 
Frazier, 1980; Freeman and Jaggie, 1982; Ingram and Wiseman, 1982; hughes et al., 2001; 
Al-tuwaijri et al., 2004; Luo and tang, 2014). thus, it is hypothesized that   
Hypothesis 1a. corporate human rights responsibility disclosure is positively associated with 
corporate human rights performance. 
Hypothesis 1b. corporate human rights responsibility disclosure is negatively associated with 
corporate human rights performance. 
3. dAtA
the empirical analysis of this study covers the largest 1,000 Korean companies from 
2007 to 2014. the companies are selected using the 2014 one thousand Large Korean 
companies’ List made by the Korea contents Media (KcM). the KcM list was compiled 
based on criteria such as sales, profit, and assets. The top 1,000 large Korean companies are 
most commonly analyzed and much information on the companies are widely available. this 
advantage outweighs the disadvantages of possible bias from sample selection. however, 
this group of companies does not represent all Korean companies, only a considerable 
proportion of them. one should note that according to the data of Statistics Korea, when self-
employed people are excluded, 24 percent of workers in the country are employed by the 
large companies in 2013 (Yu, 2015). There may exist some systematic difference between 
large companies and small and medium size companies: on the one hand, companies with a 
large amount of sales, profit, assets may be more capable of accommodating the demands of 
employees and less likely to abuse human rights. the high visibility of large companies may 
also influence positively on human rights disclosure and performances; on the other hand, 
more human rights violations may occur in large companies compared to small and medium 
size companies as big employers are likely to exploit their employees’ inclination to stay 
working at a stable and coveted workplace.
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As the measure for the dependent variable, corporate human rights performances, 
this study uses the number of complaints submitted by employees to the national Labor 
relations commission (nLrc) on the issues of unfair dismissal, unfair labor practice, and 
discrimination. the nLrc, administrative commission and independent quasi-judicial body 
composed of tripartite representatives from employees, employers, and public interests, 
mediates and adjudicates disputes between labor and management (national Labor relations 
commission, 2017). Filing a labor complaint at the nLrc is required by law before the 
dispute goes to the court, except in some special cases. As a measure of human rights 
performances of companies, the number of complaints against a company is expected to 
increase as human rights abuses of the company grow. the complaints against more abusive 
companies are expected to be higher than in less abusive companies. 
one of the greatest concerns in using the number of complaints as a measure of human 
rights performances is that people are likely to take actions including filing complaints 
or lawsuits as they become more aware of their human rights. If this is the case, more 
complaints against a company do not necessarily mean more human rights abuses but 
more awareness among its employees. this study considers the following two possibilities. 
First, the differences in number of complaints among companies may be the results of 
these differences in awareness. In that case, it is still possible to find a within-unit effect of 
disclosure reducing complaints with the fixed effect estimation method. Second, it seems 
unlikely that increasing awareness explains all of the complaints. the empirical analysis of 
this study over the period from 2007 to 2014 shows that the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between year and number of complaints is only -.001 and there is no systematic influence 
of time found in the models with year-fixed effect. this study also employs the number 
of complaints which resulted in a favorable ruling at the nLrc under the assumption that 
human rights awareness in society in general has less influence on the decisions at the NLRC 
than the complaints from employees and finds similar results. 
to measure the main explanatory variable, corporate human rights disclosure, this study 
employs the corporate human rights responsibility reporting data built by Kim et al. (2016). 
Kim et al. (2016) collected information about whether a certain company has released annual 
human rights reports following the guideline of the Global reporting Initiative (GrI) from 
2006 to 2014 and what indicators of the GrI framework the company has filled in. this 
study uses two measures for human rights disclosure, reporting and GrI indicators score. 
reporting is a binary measure of whether a company released an annual human rights report 
or not. If a company prepared and releases a report following the G3, G3.1 or G4 guidelines 
of the GrI, score 1 is assigned in the reporting year, otherwise, score 0 is assigned. the GrI 
indicators score indicates the number of labor and human rights performance indicators on 
an annual human rights report released by a company. the measure is the sum of separate 
scores for 28 indicators. A binary score is coded for each indicator in the GrI guidelines. If 
a pertinent indicator was fully reported, score 1 is assigned; partially reported, score 0.5 is 
assigned; not reported, score 0 is assigned. the GrI indicators score, as the sum of separate 
scores, ranges from 0 to 28. Both the reporting and GrI indicators score are lagged one year 
to reduce simultaneous bias.
This study also explores the influence of nine other variables on corporate human rights 
performances. Annual sales and number of employees are used as a measure of company 
size. Larger companies are likely to show their commitment to international business and 
human rights norms and implement them due to their high visibility (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006; Branco and rodrigues, 2008). number of employees should also be included as a 
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control variable in statistical models because the number of complaints, all things being 
equal, is expected to be higher in companies with a larger number of employees. this study 
also estimates all the models with an alternative measure of the number of complaints 
per employee and the results are almost identical. the zero correlation between number 
of employees and number of employees will be negative. the listing on the stock market 
variable has been reported to have a correlation with the amount of social information 
releases as well as the amount of total information release, as social visibility is perceived to 
be influenced by increases in information release (Elsakit and Worthington, 2014). For human 
rights performances, a stock market listing may give higher visibility to listed companies 
and influence their human rights performances. Public companies are likely to make a 
commitment to international business and human rights norms in line with government 
respect for international norms. data on annual sales, number of employees, listing on 
stock market, and public companies come from the dArt database system of the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS). 
the existence of a labor union is expected to be associated with firmer commitment 
and better performances. however, labor unions may also increase human rights awareness 
among employees, and it is possible that the labor union variable is related with more 
complaints. Labor union variable is coded by the authors based on the observations that there 
existed one or more enterprise unions in a company in a given year. two variables, consumer 
proximity and Environmental Sensitivity are included to estimate the impact of industry 
type on human rights disclosure and performances. the nature of critical social issues varies 
systematically across different industries (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), and companies in 
different industry sectors are expected to react differently to various social issues including 
human rights issues. companies in consumer-oriented industries are anxious to build a 
positive corporate image and are vulnerable to public criticisms (cowen, Ferreri, and Parker, 
1987; Branco and rodrigues, 2008; Vogel, 2010). companies in environmentally sensitive 
industries have experienced high-level public awareness on environmental issues as well as 
pressure from government and are likely to legitimize their behavior in front of the public 
as well as their stakeholders (deegan and Gordon, 1996; Branco and rodrigues, 2008). 
consumer proximity and Environmental Sensitivity are coded by the authors following the 
method employed by Branco and rodrigues (2008) to classify industry types. the authors 
modified their classification of high-profile companies better known to the final consumers 
and environmentally sensitive companies to take into account the unique characteristics of 
Korean industries and markets (see Kim et al., 2016). 
the human rights performances of competitors in the same industry and by companies 
in the same conglomerate group are used as measures for peer pressure. the social practices 
of prestigious and highly visible competitors or peers are observed and imitated by others 
(e.g. davis and Greve, 1997; Sherer and Lee, 2002). the measures of two variables, human 
rights performances of competitors and human rights performances in the same group 
were developed by the authors. the former is the average number of complaints of all other 
companies in the same industry of the company of interest and the latter is calculated on 
the basis of the number of complains of companies in the same conglomerate group. Both 
variables are lagged one year to reduce simultaneous bias.
A lagged dependent variable of one year is included in all the models to control for 
past performances. In studying the topic of human rights practices, the lagged dependent 
variable, that is, human rights performances of a company in the previous year, is expected to 
influence the dependent variable, that is, human rights performances in the following year.
48 chAnGroK Soh, MInWoo KIM, And YounGSoo Yu
this study adopts ownership concentration, Foreign share, and Export ratio to explain 
corporate human rights disclosure and performances. Many theoretical studies identify 
these three variables as influential elements in human rights disclosure and performance 
(e.g. cormier and Magnan, 2003; tagesson, Blank, Broberg, and collin, 2009; Vogel, 2010; 
Elsakit and Worthington, 2014). Their theoretical expectations include the negative effect of 
ownership concentration, positive effect of foreign shareholders, and positive effect of export 
on human rights disclosure or performances. the three variables come from the tS-2000 
database system of the Korea Listed companies Association. only listed companies release 
information about ownership concentration, foreign shares, and export ratio, and special 
Table 1. descriptive Statistics
Variable obs Mean Std.dev. Min Max
corporate human rights Performance
number of complaints received by the national 
Labor relations commission
8000 .470 4.153 0 255
corporate human rights disclosure
   reporting 8000 .064 .245 0 1
   Score Based on the GrI Indicators 8000 1.030 4.321 0 28
Annual Sales 7057 9.32e+09 2.41e+11 79000 1.43e+13
number of Employees 6333 1827.12 5251.173 1 101970
Labor union 8000 .448 .497 0 1
Listing on Stock Market 8000 .442 .497 0 1
Public companies 8000 .039 .194 0 1
consumer Proximity 8000 .244 .429 0 1
Environmental Sensitivity 8000 .408 .491 0 1
human rights Performance of competitors 8000 .738 1.241 0 17.375
human rights Performance in the Same Group 8000 .396 1.215 0 15.5
ownership concentration 3225 42.095 16.149 2.94 100
Foreign Share 3324 12.652 14.520 0 89.73
Export ratio 2005 30.1 .321 0 100
Exogenous Variables
   reporting by competitors 8000 .657 .475 0 1
   reporting in the Same Group 8000 .161 .367 0 1
   Score on the GrI Indicators by competitors 8000 .738 1.241 0 17.375
   Score on the GrI Indicators in the Same Group 8000 .396 1.215 0 15.5
   Environmental reporting 8000 .008 .090 0 1
   BESt Sustainability reporting 8000 .017 .130 0 1
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attention is required to interpret the results with the variables. 
Among the instrumental variables, reporting by competitors, reporting in the same 
group, GrI indicators score of competitors, and GrI indicators score in the same group are 
made in the same way that the human rights performances of competitors and in the same 
group are calculated. the two other variables, Environmental reporting and Business Ethics 
Source of top Performance Sustainability (BESt) reporting are coded by the authors based 
on the observations that a company released a report on its corporate social responsibility 
management according to the guidelines provided by the Korean government in a given 
year. More discussion on instrumental variables follows in the next section. table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in the empirical analysis of this article.
4. EStIMAtIon StrAtEGY 
the empirical analyses of the study estimate the effects of corporate human rights 
disclosure, whether a company releases human rights information and how carefully the 
company goes about reporting, on corporate human rights performances, how well human 
rights of employees are protected. the baseline model uses the ordinary least square (oLS) 
estimation method. However, as discussed above, human rights awareness may differ from 
company to company and human rights performances captured by number of complaints are 
explained more through omitted company-specific fixed factors including awareness than 
corporate human rights disclosure. The panel fixed effect estimation method is used to correct 
possible errors from omitted company-specific fixed factors. using lagged explanatory 
variables in the panel fixed effect estimation are considered as a method to correct reverse 
causality bias. In theory as well as in practice, companies which have built good human 
rights practices are more likely to adopt internationally recognized human rights norms. 
Using the panel fixed effect estimation method with lagged explanatory variables is one 
of the popular methods to identify a causal effect correcting omitted variable bias as well as 
reverse causality bias. But fixed effect estimation can only control for time-invariant effects 
but not for time-variant effects. If there are time-variant omitted factors, the instrumental 
variable method can be alternative to panel fixed effect estimation method. Thus, this study 
also estimates the effect of corporate human rights disclosure on corporate human rights 
performances with the instrumental variable method.
the key idea of the instrumental variable method is to find and isolate an exogenous 
variation in the endogenous variable and identify its causal effect on the outcome variable. 
If a valid exogenous variable(s), which is (are) correlated with the endogenous variable 
but uncorrelated with the error term, is (are) found, whether human rights disclosure has a 
direct, independent effect on human rights performances can be confirmed. The two stage 
least squares (2sls) regression models employ instrumental variables including reporting 
by competitors, reporting in the same group, GrI indicators score of competitors, GrI 
indicators score in the same group, Environmental reporting and Business Ethics Source 
of top Performance Sustainability (BESt) reporting, and lagged human rights reporting. 
the human rights disclosure by competitors in the same industry or peers in the same 
conglomerate group are thought to influence on human rights disclosure of the company of 
interest, independent of internal factors of the company including human rights performances, 
the dependent variable. the adoption of two government reporting guidelines are also 
employed as instrumental variables which have an influence on human rights reporting but 
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are not correlated and are independent of other factors. the inclusion of lagged values of 
endogenous variable as an instrumental variable has been debated but recommended by many 
studies (e.g. Barro, 1996; reed, 2015).
5. rESuLtS
table 2 presents the results of the oLS estimations and the fixed effect estimations. 
the coefficients of corporate human rights disclosure, the key explanatory variable, both 
Reporting and GRI indicators score, have a negative sign but only the coefficients of GRI 
indicators score variable have a statistical significance. the results indicate that human 
rights performances of companies are not influenced by whether or not companies simply 
release their human rights report but by how careful companies handle their human rights 
reporting. the correlation between GrI indicators score and number of complaints are 
confirmed in the panel fixed effect model estimation. When a company produces a careful 
report complying with international guidelines, the company is more likely to have better 
human rights performances. As shown in table 2, other explanatory variables discussed in 
Table 2. corporate human rights disclosure and Performance (Single Stage)
oLS Fixed Effect oLS Fixed Effect
corporate human rights disclosure
   reporting -.090(.238) -.209(.258)
   GrI Indicators Score -.056(.013)*** -.041(.014)**
Annual Sales -.000(.000) .000(.000) -.000(.000) .000(.000)
number of Employees .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)***
Labor union .227(.108)* .258(.107)*
Listing on Stock Market -.040(.108) -.003(.107)
Public companies 2.595(.402)*** 3.099(.399)***
consumer Proximity .168(.129) .153(.129)
Environmental Sensitivity .059(.107) .074(.107)
hr Performance of competitors -.026(.071) -.016(.073) -.023(.071) -.010(.073)
hr Performance in the Same Group .004(.073) -.020(.082) .025(.073) -.015(.082)
Lagged dependent Variable .343(.012)*** .117(.012)*** .342(.012)*** .118(.012)***
constant -.124(.090) .267(.052) -.145(.090) .272(.052)
n 6272 8268 6272 .8268
r² .1929 .1717 .1952 .1693
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed).
the results with three more variables including ownership concentration, Foreign share, and Export 
ratio are available from the authors. None of them show statistical significance.
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the previous theoretical or empirical studies mostly do not have a significant and consistent 
effect on human rights performances of companies as expected. Only Number of employees 
has a positive effect on Number of complaints, which confirms that there is a zero correlation 
between the variable. Labor union and Public companies have a significant effect, but the 
direction of the effect is opposite to what was expected. The link between labor unions and 
more complaints could be explained by the role of unions in educating and representing 
workers about their rights and subsequent increased awareness of violations. For the positive 
correlation between public companies and the number of complaints, it may have to do with 
the private companies’ practices of softening forced layoffs with substantial amounts of 
compensation. In contrast, employees of public companies are more likely to resort to the 
dispute resolution process of the nLrc.
table 3 shows the 2sls estimations of the effect of corporate human rights disclosure 
on human rights performances. the lower panel of table 3 shows the results of the first 
stage of the models. human rights disclosure, either reporting or GrI indicators score is 
explained through the variables including Annual sales, number of employees, Labor union, 
Listing on stock market, Public companies, and most of all, instrumental variables, human 
rights disclosure measured with GrI indicators score, Environmental reporting, and BESt 
sustainability reporting have significant effect on corporate human rights reporting. Four 
of five instruments are significant predictors of the endogenous variable. the coefficients 
on the four instruments are statistically significant at the level of .001. The instruments are 
very strong and there is no weak instrument problem. the partial r² is between .3008 and 
.3645 and the cragg-donald F-statistic ranges from 1097.86 to 2295.83. Based on the cragg-
donald F-statistic, the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak is rejected far beyond 
the critical values of a 10% maximal IV size that Stock and Yogo (2002) propose.
the results of the second stage of the models, shown in the top panel, are almost identical 
with the single stage models. The negative and significant effect of GRI indicators score on 
number of complaints is confirmed in the models with the instrumental variable method. 
the results once again suggest the importance of careful reporting. the positive correlations 
between Labor union and number of complaints and between Public companies and number 
of complaints are also found. the Sargan-hansen statistic offers a standard to accept or 
reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. When 
GrI indicators score by competitors in the same industry, GrI indicators score in the same 
group, and lagged GrI indicator score of the company or interest are used as instrumental 
variables, Sargan-Hansen statistic is sufficiently small (the reported p-values are sufficiently 
large) for not rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments were uncorrelated with the 
error term at the level of .10. When two more variables, Environmental reporting and BESt 
sustainability reporting are added to the three instrumental variables, the overall results 
appear the same but the exogeneity of the two additional instruments are in question. the 
results of the durbin-Wu-hausman chi-square test, shown at the bottom of the second 
stage results, confirm that it is not necessary to discard the coefficients estimated with the 
single stage oLS regression method. the consistent estimations of the coefficients in the 
2SLS regression estimation are not so different. In summary, the empirical analyses of this 
study found no consistent effect of corporate human rights disclosure on corporate human 
rights performances. Rather, only careful reporting has a significant impact on human rights 
performances. 
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Table 3. corporate human rights disclosure and Performance ( 2SLS Estimation)
human rights Performance (2nd Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
corporate human rights 
disclosure (Instrumented)
   reporting -.092(.401) .410(.394)
  GrI Indicators Score -.063(.024)** -.044(.024)^
Annual Sales -.000(.000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000)
number of Employees .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)***
Labor union .227(.108)* .213(.108)* .262(.108)* .250(.108)*
Listing on Stock Market -.040(.109) -.064(.109) .001(.108) -.013(.108)
Public companies 2.596(.442)*** 2.309(.440)*** 3.161(.445)*** 2.973(.444)***
consumer Proximity .168(.129) .176(.129) .151(.129) .156(.129)
Environmental Sensitivity .059(.107) .052(.107) .076(.107) .070(.107)
hr Performance of competitors -.026(.071) -.029(.071) -.022(.072) -.024(.071)
hr Performance in the Same 
Group
.004(.074) -.006(.074) .028(.074) .020(.074)
Lagged dependent Variable .343(.012)*** .343(.012)*** .342(.012)*** .342(.012)***
constant -.124(.090) -.113(.090) -.148(.090) -.140(.090)
n 6272 6272 6272 6272
r² .1929 .1923 .1952 .1951
Sargan Statistic (chi-sq p-value) 3.056(.217) 78.226(.000) .917(.632) 81.569(.000)
dWh chi-sq test Statistic (p-value) .000(.995) 2.538(.111) .099(.752) .427(.513)
human rights disclosure (1st Stage)
hr reporting GrI Indicators Score
Included Variables
   Annual Sales .000(.000) .000(.000)^ -.000(.000)** -.000(.000)*
   number of Employees .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)***
   Labor union .015(.005)** .014(.005)** .269(.086)** .237(.086)**
   Listing on Stock Market .024(.005)*** .022(.005)*** .395(.086)*** .364(.085)***
   Public companies .288(.017)*** .257(.017)*** 5.303(.319)*** 4.665(.326)***
   consumer Proximity -.006(.006) -.007(.005) -.151(.104) -.158(.103)
   Environmental Sensitivity .008(.005) .007(.005) .148(.087)^ .155(.087)^
hr Performance of competitors .004(.003) .004(.003) .115(.057)* .098(.057)^
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6. concLuSIon
As international business and human rights norms have expanded and a new focus on 
implementation mechanisms has come to light, business organizations as well as society 
in general are growing concerned about human rights in business sectors. the increasing 
number of voluntary compliances of companies with corporate human rights reporting 
guidelines can be interpreted as a norm cascade following the norm emergence. however, it 
is not yet clear if business organizations are wholeheartedly adopting the new norms because 
the establishment of binding norms in the private sector is unprecedented. At the moment, 
implementation mechanisms do not exist, and everything hinges on voluntary decisions of 
companies. This study investigated the effectiveness of corporate human rights disclosure as 
an instrument of internalization of international business and human rights norms. 
As we saw with the literature on corporate social and environmental reporting, the 
Table 3. (continued)
human rights disclosure (1st Stage)
hr reporting GrI Indicators Score
hr Performance in the Same 
Group
-.000(.003) -.001(.003) .110(.061)^ .087(.061)
   Lagged dependent Variable .000(.001) -.000(.001) .008(.010) .001(.001)
Excluded Variables
   hr reporting of competitors .004(.005) .006(.005)
   hr reporting in the Same Group .048(.007)***  .047(.007)***
   GrI Indicators Score of  
   competitors
.043(.036) .058(.036)
   GrI Indicators Score in the Same 
   Group
.233(.034)*** .240(.034)***
   Environmental reporting .193(.023)*** 1.647(.418)***
   BESt Sustainability reporting .155(.019)*** 2.901(.353)***
   Lagged hr reporting/GrI  
   Indicators Score
.619(.011)*** .586(.011)*** .572(.012)*** .549(.012)***
constant -.020(.005) -.020(.005) -.319(.074) -.316(.074)
n 6272 6272 6272 6272
r² .5430 .5523 .4765 .4830
Shea Partial r² .3513 .3645 .3008 .3095
cragg-donald Wald F statistic 
(p-value)
.2295.83(.000) 1477.26(.000) 1707.23(.000) 1097.86(.000)
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed).
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linkage between disclosure and performance is complex. It was also the case in this research. 
corporate human rights responsibility performance was not consistently associated with 
the disclosure of human rights reports. nevertheless, the empirical analyses showed that 
only reporting in compliance with international guidelines affects corporate human rights 
performances. the effect of careful reporting was confirmed with the panel fixed effect 
method and the instrumental variable method. In the panel fixed effect estimation, the within-
unit effect of careful reporting is found, which suggests that a company is more likely to 
protect human rights as the company adopted the international human rights reporting 
guidelines with care and release an elaborative report on its human rights performances. In 
the 2sls regression estimation, the effect of careful reporting is found after controlling for the 
reverse causality bias.  ultimately, it is the quality of the reporting that matters, not the report 
itself.
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